# Open Source D7 R4 1NC vs Pitt AM

## Off-Case

### OFF

#### The aff must be topical---they violate:

#### The “United States federal government” is the three branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>; RP]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ are statutes.

Grimes ’20 [Charles W; 2020; editor of this Licensing Update and Law Professor at Ava Maria Law School; Wolters Kluwer, “Licensing Update,” https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf]

§13.02 ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Their ‘scope’ is defined by government.

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### ‘Prohibitions’ are laws.

Collins ’12 [Collins English Dictionary; carbon dated April 23, 2012; “prohibition,” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/prohibition]

1. COUNTABLE NOUN

A prohibition is a law or rule forbidding something.

A prohibition is a law or rule forbidding something.

That’s key to ensure negative contestability---alternative frameworks crush limits by deviating from the resolutional agent and mechanism, make affirmative content unpredictable, AND selectively erase negative ground by reclarifying their advocacy.

#### There’s 2 impacts---

#### 1) Fairness---Predictability of the resolution ensures an equal chance to win 50% of debates on the negative---non-resolutional aff choice overstretches the research burden which puts them structurally ahead. It also decreases the viability of pre-tournament prep which unbalances the game. That’s an impact since debate is inherently a competitive space and the ability to win each individual debate matters---especially true considering the ballot can only resolve our procedural impacts

#### 2) Iteration---resolutional stasis is key to refute the aff rigorously---their interpretation encourages AFF conditionality and shielding links since their advocacy isn’t tied to a predictable stasis---that encourages teams to craft the trickiest 1AC which prevents testing over essential truth-claims and solvency---instead prefer debates against well-prepared opponents that make us better advocates---that fosters the best disagreement and ensures we have the ability to persuade people who hold dissenting opinions

Default to competing interpretations---winning the 1AC was good doesn’t prove their counterinterpretation is. Neg framework ballots pick a winner but no ballot solves structural impacts. Any “net benefit” to their interp that isn’t about the types of debates it encourages is not offense---you can vote neg and agree with claims like “the 1AC was good” or “some topical debates could be bad”.

### OFF

#### Pharmaceutical corporations, investment, and competition are key to widespread drug innovation---antitrust trades off.

Mosoff et al. ’19 [Adam, Kristen Osenga, Randall Rader, Mark Schultz, and Saurabh Vishnubhakat; January 28; Professor of Law at George Mason University; Regulatory Transparency Project, “How Antitrust Overreach is Threatening Healthcare Innovation,” <https://regproject.org/paper/how-antitrust-overreach-is-threatening-healthcare-innovation/>]

In recent years, however, other government agencies have played an increasingly intrusive role in deciding whether and when new drugs can enter the market. One such agency is the Federal Trade Commission, which has recently taken steps to block branded drug companies from settling patent litigation with generic drug makers. The FTC substitutes its own judgment for the business judgment of sophisticated parties, simultaneously weakening the patent rights of branded drug companies that spend billions in drug discovery and development and delaying generic drug companies from bringing consumers low cost alternatives to branded drugs. This example of government agencies picking winners and losers—indeed, deciding there should be no winners and losers—harms consumers in the short run by slowing access to drugs and in the long run by weakening innovation.

This paper describes the role of patents in protecting drugs as well as the special patent litigation regime Congress enacted in the 1980s to carefully balance the needs of branded drug companies, generic competitors, and consumers. Although these systems are not perfect, the FTC’s overuse of its regulatory powers results in a net loss for American consumers, as described below.

I. The Vital Role of Patents (and Patent Litigation) in Protecting Pharmaceutical Innovation While Ensuring Access to Generic Drugs

A drug faces a long and uncertain road to market. Scientists often begin by screening hundreds of compounds to discover or identify compounds that show possible potency for continued research and development efforts. The few compounds that advance beyond laboratory and animal testing then face years of trials in humans. Even then, FDA approval is not guaranteed. A drug that shows promise in the laboratory and effectively treats animals may not work in people. A drug may have serious side effects in humans that outweigh any benefits the drug offers. The timeline from drug discovery to approval averages more than a decade. For every five thousand drugs that start the process in the laboratory, the FDA approves only one. Drug development is a lengthy, risky, and expensive process.

Patents play a key role in allowing drug companies to make massive investments against these long odds. A patent grants a drug company a period of exclusivity for twenty years: from the time the patent is filed until the day it expires. This allows the drug developer to charge a premium price for its newly discovered drug for a limited time. Without robust patent protections, branded pharmaceutical companies would have no way to recoup their R&D investments and no incentive to find new drugs. Once a drug has been discovered, developed, and tested, there are relatively few technological and economic barriers to competitors making copies of that drug.

#### Innovation optimizes synthetic biology---extinction.

Karoui et al. ’19 [Meriem, Monica Hoyos-Flight, and Liz Fletcher; August 7; Centre for Synthetic and Systems Biology in the School of Biological Sciences at the University of Edinburgh; Innogen Institute in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Edinburgh; Frontiers, “Future Trends in Synthetic Biology—A Report,” <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00175/full>]

Tackling Risk

Synthetic biology is an example of a dual-use technology: it promises numerous beneficial applications, but it can also cause harm. This has led to fears that it could, intentionally or unintentionally, harm humans or damage the environment. For example, there is huge value in our ability to engineer viruses to be more effective and specific shuttles for gene therapies of devastating inherited disorders; however, engineering viruses may also lead to the creation of even more deadly pathogens by those intent on harm.

“Synthetic biology should be regarded as an extension of earlier developments and technologies”

Some would argue that synthetic biology poses an existential risk and needs to be treated with extreme caution. However, many new technological advances across the decades have met similar concerns. The uncertainty and remote possibility of such risks could hamper the development of useful technology. Scientists, their host institutions and funding bodies should (and indeed already do) consider whether the research planned could be misused. Measures that reduce the likelihood of misuse and its consequences should be implemented and clearly communicated. The synthetic biology community needs to be aware of, and respond to, these challenges by engaging in horizon scanning exercises as well as open dialogue with regulatory bodies and the media.

“Don't avoid risk – manage it”

Being more open about risks, and how they are controlled, provides an opportunity to shift discourse toward the benefits of synthetic biology in addressing urgent global needs, such as the production of biofuels, food security and more effective medicines, and potentially improve public acceptance.

“The questions should not be ‘what’s the next big thing for synthetic biology' but ‘where is the greatest unmet need’.”

Despite the efforts by individual countries to establish synthetic biology research roadmaps, broader, international agreement on common standards (and red lines) across the field may help establish trust and to advance the best pre-competitive research into useful applications.

Meeting participants highlighted the importance of training in responsible research conduct and ethics. Given students' future role as science ambassadors and influencers, their training should not only convey skills and knowledge but also awareness and critical thinking about the prospects and potential for dual use of synthetic biology. All researchers must remain vigilant regardless of the many pressures and distractions of running a successful research lab; they may not have specialist training in identifying the risks of misuse but they are the people best placed to maintain informed oversight of risks.

One example of current synthetic biology research with potential dual use is gene drive technology, which can be used to propagate a particular suite of genes throughout a population. The benefits of using gene drive technology include the eradication of disease-carrying insect populations and the elimination of invading pest species but it has raised concerns about the unintended ecological impacts of reducing or eliminating a population ([Callaway, 2018](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00175/full#B5); [Collins, 2018](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00175/full#B9)).

Similar release concerns surround research that is harnessing the ability of pathogens to target particular tissues in the body or particular chemicals in the environment, which could greatly aid efforts to deliver targeted therapies or clean-up contaminated sites. To date, such large-scale release for environmental bioremediation interventions has not been possible.

“We need to mind the gap between R&D scale up and communications …. One bad blog can kill a commercial product”

There was consensus that the need for regulation over this community remains important. Regulation needs to keep up to speed with the emerging technologies and should focus on the product rather than the process used to create it ([Tait et al., 2017](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00175/full#B34)). Unsuitable regulatory frameworks (as well as unfavorable public perception) could discourage private sector investment in synthetic biology.

### OFF

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its regulation of the private sector, including expansion of economic welfare, expanded educational funding, increase regulation on decentralized finance, and fund and deploy carbon capture and storage technology

#### Regulation more effectively combats the excesses of capitalism than attempted transition.

Teixeira and Judis, 17—senior fellow at both The Century Foundation and American Progress AND editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo, former senior writer at The National Journal and a former senior editor at The New Republic (Ruy and John, “Why The Left Will (Eventually) Triumph: An Interview With Ruy Teixeira,” <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/why-left-will-eventually-win-ruy-teixeira>, dml)

Judis: In your book, you explain at several points that you are no longer a socialist and instead support a reformed capitalism. When we met many years ago, we were in a socialist organization. When did this transformation occur?

Teixeira: What happened is that I began to think a lot about how economies actually work. When I was a socialist, I didn’t think very carefully and long about what actually a socialist economy would look like. I had this general idea that the capitalist system was inefficient and prone to crisis and that one should somehow tamp down the profit motive and limit the freedom of action of capitalists. But the more I thought about how economies worked, it was hard to gainsay that the market was absolutely essential for the efficient delivery of goods and services. And the more I read, the more I realized my viewpoint was closer to social democrats than to socialists. Capitalism needs to be regulated, it needs to be pointed in the right direction, you need to have a big safety net, but you can’t replace it.

Judis: Was there something that happened, a book you read, that changed your mind?

Teixeira: I would say it was an obscure book by Alec Nove called “The Economics of Feasible Socialism.”

Judis: That’s amazing. I was deeply influenced by the same book.

Teixeira: Nove was a historian of the Soviet Union. He came from a Menshevik family, and he basically laid out the way the standard conceptions of socialism that a lot of people on the left had couldn’t work. If you wanted to think rationally about what’s feasible, the way economies and people tend to work, you had to have a market.

The goal as I see it is a mixed economy that works as well as possible, and of course you have not gotten that in the West for the last several decades. The mixed economy just needs improvement and modification.

Judis: And what kind of improvements would that be?

Teixeira; I favor what economists are calling a model of equitable growth. It would mean substantial government investment in creating new opportunities for the middle and aspirational classes. It could include a dramatic expansion of the educational system and a Manhattan-style investment in bringing down the price of clean energy and building the infrastructure to match. Granted, these kind of proposals would not get through Congress now, but it is the kind of agenda that I am optimistic that the Democrats will endorse and that the country will eventually embrace.

The Left Prospers in Prosperity

Judis: Your book is titled “The Optimistic Leftist,” but if you look at the terrain of politics today, the center-left or left of center parties are decimated. The Democrats haven’t been in such bad shape nationally and in the states since the 1920s. The Dutch Labor Party got less than 10 percent in the recent election. Jeremy Corbyn and British Labor may be routed in June. The French Socialist candidate came in fifth with 6 percent. Why is this happening? And given that this is happening, what grounds do you have for thinking that the left will suddenly find itself on top?

Teixeira: The way I look at it we are going through a long transition from an industrial capitalist system to a post-industrial services-based capitalist system. So far this transition has not gone well. It hasn’t had the outcomes that people want. We have slow productivity growth and rising inequality. The central point I’d make is that by and large, poor economic times are not good for the left. They make people reactive, pessimistic, trying to hold onto their own, and not supportive of collective endeavors to help the way society functions. And we’ve seen all that in spades in the last decade.

Really that kind of situation is best for the right, and the left has had a very difficult time figuring out a way forward. The Democrats have their problems, but in Europe, you see the problems crystallized. Europe’s mainstream left was based in the industrial working class and has had a terrible time adjusting to the transition to post-industrial capitalism and figuring out what a new model of capitalism and capitalist growth would look like.

They have thrown in their lot with a much more right-wing approach, beginning with the Third Way in the ’90s. The idea behind it was that capitalism can pretty well function on its own and we just have to let it rip. We’re still coming out of that phase, and I think the mainstream social democrats with their collaboration with austerity in places like France and the Netherlands are reaping the whirlwind.

But if you look at other parts of the left, they are actually doing relatively well. If you look at the Netherlands election, the green left did very well, and if you add up the votes of the Socialist Party (a left-socialist party), the greens, Democrats 66 (a left social-liberal party) and the social democrats, the left hasn’t been totally decimated. What has really been decimated is the Party of Labor, as the social democrats in the Netherlands are called. We are seeing the same thing in France where the Socialist Party (the French social democrats) candidate did terribly, but [independent socialist Jean-Luc] Melenchon did quite well. The left still has strength, but it is divided up among different political tendencies. It is going to have to reorganize itself around an economic program that is going to deliver what people want, which is better growth and better distribution. Until that happens, the left will be in a quagmire.

Judis: I want to look more closely at your argument that the left does better in good times and the right in bad times. Bill Clinton got elected in the wake of a recession in 1992, Barack Obama might not have won the presidency in 2008 if the financial crash hadn’t happened that September. The Populists came out of the farm crisis in 1880s and early 1890s; the New Deal out of the Great Depression. I am not saying that bad times is better for the left, but only that there isn’t a necessary connection in either case and that you are making too facile an assumption about which times promote which politics.

Teixeira: Bad times do propel people into motion and produce protest and reaction, but looked at from when you can accomplish the goals of the left of making society better and implementing important reforms, I think it is typically easier when the economy is expanding fairly rapidly and living standards are going up than when the reverse is true. It is not a perfect relationship, but by and large I think it’s true. So yeah, Obama can get elected in a situation where he was aided by an economic downturn, but his ability to put together a progressive coalition that could stick together for a long time and continue to implement reforms was very much undermined by the economic situation.

Judis: Let’s turn it around and look at the connection between the right and good and bad times. In America, the 1920s were relatively good times, and the Republicans controlled the government the whole decade.

Teixeira: The 1920s were not nearly as good a time people think it was. It was a time of relatively slow per capita income growth. It was very unequally distributed, the industrial working class did somewhat well, but the rural areas did poorly, and there were four recessions between 1918 and 1929. It was not such a great time. It was relatively poor compared to the Progressive Era.

Judis: So the Republicans did well in the 1920s because they were really bad times?

Teixeira: There was a sense of real uncertainty, real economic paranoia.

Judis: I don’t think you could call the 1920s bad times. You could call it uneven times. “Bad times” is stretching it. In addition, you have the real bad times of the Depression staring you in your face which is the time of the greatest advance in terms of a left and social democracy in our history.

Teixeira: Desperate times make for desperate measure sometimes. There is no guarantee they will help the left rather than the right. I think that’s what we saw in the U.S. Obviously it didn’t work out so well in Europe. When I make the general analysis that the left is better off in a period of economic expansion and rising living standards, it doesn’t correspond exactly to the political outcomes you’ll have in those different periods. I am saying that in a general sense, the left has the easiest time making advances and improving society when things are going well rather than when are going poorly.

Judis: Let’s look at Europe. In some of the countries in Northern Europe that are doing well, the center-right parties are in charge.

Teixeira: Yes, but I think you can make the case the center-right parties aren’t exactly in charge in Europe. They also have their problems. The rise of populism in Europe is blowing apart the party system.

Judis: You have got Holland, Denmark, Germany, and Austria. Those are all countries that are doing pretty well compared to the rest of the EU and that have center-right governments.

Teixeira: The Netherlands is not doing that well. It’s all relative. Their recovery has been somewhat better. Their employment level has been high compared to other European countries, but there are a number of cuts in social services, wages haven’t been going up much, there is a lot more insecurity.

Judis: Isn’t Germany doing well?

Teixeira:. Germany is doing relatively well, but it hasn’t been a period of expansive growth for them either. There is a lot of wage stagnation and compression there. I never meant to imply that you can perfectly predict social reform from economic outcomes. But I think it provides an important lens on when the left does well and when the left does poorly. By and large when you look at Europe, you see the ~~straitjacket~~ [dilemma] that the Eurozone has created in the economies. People are fearful, they are pessimistic, they are passive. This is very bad for the left. Until you break out of that [dilemma] ~~straitjacket~~, the left is not going to be able to do that well, and the right is going to continue to do relatively well compared to them, and you’ll see the continued rise in populism because people have no faith in the system. So what I am trying to do is to get the left to focus on getting to a new stage of capitalist growth and being able actually to deliver rising incomes.

There is No Alternative to the Left

Judis: So let’s talk about how this political change will come about. What I took from your book is that we are currently suffering from secular stagnation, and that to get to a new stage of growth, we will have to implement the kind of left program that you describe. I worry that this argument contains a contradiction. On the one hand, the left can’t get its program enacted as long as times are bad. On the other hand, the only way to get out of bad times is for the left to get its program enacted.

Teixeira: I see what you are asking. I think it is going to be two steps forward, one step back. We are sort of slouching toward the next stage of capitalism. I don’t think it’s going to be pretty. Political and economic factors are going to propel us in that direction. Ultimately, people want things to work better, they want their problems to be solved. And the only way we are going to get there is along the road I have described. I think this equitable growth approach that the Democrats united around is the future. The level of growth is going to vary over time, but I think the Democrats are the ones who are going to put us there and I think they are going to be rewarded for it.

Judis:. But how does that happen? Isn’t there a crisis scenario implicit in your account? At some time, the current Third Way or neoliberal approach results in another Great Recession and at that point people will buy into a left-wing approach, the left-wing approach will create prosperity and at that time we will have an enduring left-wing or Democratic majority. Isn’t a step like this missing from your argument?

Teixeira:. That certainly could be the way it goes down, but it’s not clear we are required to have a recession on the level we did in 2007 and 2008, or whether this sort of rolling crisis we have combined with other political events might do it. I don’t know, it’s hard to predict, but I think the great economist Herbert Stein said, if something cannot go on forever, it will stop.

Judis: The great socialist Rosa Luxembourg said the choice was socialism or barbarism. I am not saying we are heading toward barbarism, but I think there is a determinism in your argument. I think you are saying that people will eventually choose a politics that will best help them. Reason will prevail. And I am not sure if that holds up historically. When you talk about the EU, you say eventually they will consolidate into a fiscal monetary union. I am not sure that is going to happen. It’s also possible that the Eurozone could break up and that there could be a lot of chaos. We have periods in history where things don’t happen in the best of all possible ways.

Teixeira: The trajectory is ultimately going to take us to a different and better place. I think eventually we will adapt and we will get something better than we have because it is the only solution to the ongoing problems. There is no alternative.

Judis: Countries are sometime structurally unable to do what is in their best interest. In the U.S., we have this strong anti-statist tradition going back to the revolution that seems to get in the way every time we want to do something like what you are proposing. It is possible that contrary to Hegel, the rational won’t turn out to be the real.

Teixeira: Of course it is possible, but if you look at the history of the United States, despite the anti-statist bias and despite all the other political problems, the way the country has evolved over time is toward a larger government that does more and provides more for people. And we obviously have evolved tremendously in the social realm as well. Governments don’t do what is rational in the short term, at least rational in the sense you are describing it, but political systems evolve over time in a way that is consistent with the values and priorities of the left, and I expect that to continue over time.

The 2016 Election

Judis: Let’s talk about the 2016 election. Why did Clinton lose to such a weak opponent?

Teixeira: The Democrats have an evolving majority that consists of groups like minorities, professionals, young people, single women and what have you, and that’s a true fact. It’s growing over time and it will continue to grow, but it was always mathematically true that if you take the declining group, the white non-college voters, and they move sufficiently in the direction of the other party, that will be enough to undermine your coalition. You won’t win. That’s exactly what happened in 2016. These voters moved rapidly away from the Democrats both in local and state races and in the presidential election.

Judis: Why did they move?

Teixeira: They do not have any faith that the Democrats share their values and are going to deliver a better life for them and their kids, and I think Hillary Clinton was a very efficient bearer of that meme. Whether she wanted to or not, the message she sent to these voters is that you are really not that important and I don’t take your problems seriously, and frankly I don’t have much to offer you. And that’s despite the fact that her economic program and policies would have actually been very good for these people. There was a study of campaign advertising in 2016 that showed Hillary outspent Trump significantly and that almost none of her advertising was about what she would actually do. Almost all of it was about how he was a bad dude.

Voters were fed up with stagnation and with the Democrats and they turned to someone who thought could blow up the system. The way the Democrats and the left could mitigate that problem is to show these voters that they take their problems seriously and have their interests in mind, and could improve their lives. I don’t think there is any way of doing that without a new model of economic growth.

## Case

### Presumption

#### The aff equates political imagination with political praxis – the problem, however, with revolutionary struggles isn’t the lack of resistance – it’s the lack of organizational consistency.

**Nail 10** (Thomas, postdoctoral lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Denver, published in Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies Volume 2010.1 “Constructivism and the Future Anterior of Radical Politics” <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/thomas-nail-constructivism-and-the-future-anterior-of-radical-politics>, kbb)

Radical politics today faces **a two-fold challenge**: to show the problems and **undesirability**of the current structures of exclusion and power, and to show the **desirability** and coherency of various alternatives that may take their place. This paper argues that over the last 15 years, in particular, radical politics have been vastly more attentive to the former than to the latter and that what is now required is an appropriate shift in practical and theoretical efforts toward more constructive and prefigurative activities. In particular, the politics of difference, often associated with post-structuralist political theory and contemporary radical politics would do well to attend more closely to some of the more productive and promising political experiments emerging today. Not merely by exemplifying them as instances of a general potential for political transformation, as is more often the case, but to concretely clarify their field of struggle, the types of political subjects they create, what makes them desirable as alternatives, and the dangers these experiments confront. That is, radical political theory **can no longer be satisfied** with the **mere critique**of various forms **of representation** and essentialism in favour of difference and the affirmation that **“another world is possible.”**It has been ten years since this admittedly important slogan was adopted by the World Social Forum, but it is time that radical theory and practice begin **to create a new praxis** adequate to the world that will have been emerging: our political future anterior. To be clear, I am not arguing that radical political theory does not engage contemporary political events. I am arguing that it has disproportionally favoured the practice of critiquing of them, and insufficiently engaged political events that propose inspiring alternatives to the present. For the most part it has merely exemplified them in name: the No Borders Movement, Zapatismo, the Landless Peasants Movement, etc. These events are understood as parts of a new revolutionary sequence demonstrating the possibility of another world. A shift in radical political theory toward a clarification, valorization, and prefiguration of these events that are currently drawing an outline of the future would thus have the following advantages: (1) It would prove, against its critics, that post-structuralism (in particular) is not merely an abstract theoretical discourse, but has analytical tools adequate to contemporary struggles; (2) It would help clarify the structure and importance of radical political events, not only for those subject to the event, but for those who do not yet understand its consequences; (3) Finally, it would show the intelligibility and desirability of promising alternatives to present authoritarian phenomena. But since the analytical category of “radical political theory” is perhaps too broad to address in this paper, I would like to focus my argument on what I think is one of the more prominent efforts to connect radical theory to contemporary political struggles: post-anarchism. Post-anarchism is the explicit conjunction between post-structuralist political philosophy and anti-authoritarian politics. Here one might expect to see a relatively high degree of theoretical analysis of concrete political struggles with an attention to their prefigurative capacity to create a new future in the present. But for the most part this has not been the case, although there are some recent notable exceptions.[[1]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/thomas-nail-constructivism-and-the-future-anterior-of-radical-politics#fn1) Post-anarchism has often been criticized for being either a purely scholastic critique of humanist essentialism in classical anarchism (Kropotkin, Bakunin, Proudhon) or being a purely theoretical effort with only speculative relation to the political field. But while I too remain so far unconvinced by articulations of post-anarchism’s applicability to the political field, I also believe that it does have the ability to offer a host of constructive analytical tools that other political theories lack. In this paper, I aim to vindicate this capacity. Post-anarchism is perhaps too large of an analytical category to digest. Todd May has drawn on the work of Deleuze, Foucault, and Rancière, while Saul Newman has focused his own on that of Lacan, Derrida, and Badiou. These are all very different thinkers and it would be a mistake to conflate them into a single post-anarchist position. But distinguishing them all or attempting to re-synthesize their “anarchist” inclinations is perhaps equally indigestible. Thus, I would like to make a more modest intervention into this discussion in a way that not only provides support for my thesis, that the political philosophy of difference (adopted by post-anarchism) is insufficient for understanding the positive contributions of anti-authoritarian struggles, but also motivates a turn to a more constructive analysis of contemporary events. By constructive analysis, I mean a theoretical focus on the degree to which political struggles offer or inspire alternative modes of social organization. To do this I will draw on two figures associated with post-anarchism who I believe articulate an overlooked potential for a more constructive theoretical contribution: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari are particularly useful for three reasons: (1) they are post-structuralist philosophers who explicitly reject the representational politics of the state, party, and vanguard and (2) who, according to Todd May, supposedly affirm a political philosophy of difference. But more importantly, (3) Deleuze and Guattari also propose three positive political strategies often expressed in anti-authoritarian experiments that I think have been overlooked in post-anarchist readings of these philosophers. I think these strategies are able to show the unique analytical strength of post-anarchism’s contribution to concrete struggles. Additionally, and following my own imperative to examine more closely positive political experiments offering alternatives to the present, I want to look at the often touted, post-anarchist political event of Zapatismo.[[2]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/thomas-nail-constructivism-and-the-future-anterior-of-radical-politics#fn2) Zapatismo has achieved a relatively high degree of success, or stability over the past 15 years, and I believe it corroborates at least three of the transferable political strategies found in the post-anarchism of Deleuze and Guattari: (1) a multi-centered strategy of political diagnosis, (2) a prefigurative strategy of political transformation, and (3) a participatory strategy of organizing institutions. These strategies are both inventions specific to Zapatismo but also consonant with several political-theoretical structures in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Before I begin with an analysis of these three post-structuralist or post-anarchist strategic insights located in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas, I want to be clear of precisely what I find so insufficient in post-anarchist political theory and why I think it would benefit from engaging in more prefigurative political analyses. My criticisms are by no means meant to capture all of post-anarchism, but only a specific formulation of it I find particularly insufficient. While there are of course many anarchists writing under the proper name of post-anarchism, there are, I think, two distinguishing features that unite the particular formulation I want to focus on: (1) the critique of all forms of authoritarianism and representation (statism, capitalism, vanguardism, essentialism, identity politics, etc.) and (2) more positively, the affirmation of difference. Unlike classical anarchism, Newman and May claim, post-anarchism does not rely on naturalism or humanist essentialism, but rather affirms difference as the radical horizon of politics as such. According to Newman, it is “the infinite demand that will remain unfulfilled and never grounded in any concrete normative social order” (Newman, 2007: 11). Todd May accordingly defines post-anarchism by two central commitments: the “anti-representationalist principle” and the “principle of promoting differences” (May, 1994: 135). This is the formulation of post-anarchism that I find most inadequate and ill-equipped for theorizing constructive alternatives to contemporary forms of political domination and exclusion. Given this commitment to anti-authoritarianism and the promotion of difference, understood positively as the radical possibility “to create new, non-statist forms of communal association and direct democracy that would make the state irrelevant,” how are we to understand the relationship between, on the one hand, this radical possibility freed from the constraints of authoritarianism, and on the other the concrete practices of direct democracy that may or may not come to realize the “infinite demands” of post-anarchism (Newman, 2007: 8)? Not only does post-anarchism reject any concrete practices that would seek to centralize power but, according to May and Newman, it also rejects institutions themselves as forms of coercion and authority (Newman, 2007: 4).[[3]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/thomas-nail-constructivism-and-the-future-anterior-of-radical-politics#fn3) How then are we to understand, positively, the kinds of organizations post-anarchism is proposing as alternatives to the coercive ones currently in place? In an anarchist society how will decisions be made on global issues like climate change, border issues, and pollution? How will the fair exchange of goods and services take place and how will we negotiate conflicts among community groups without centralized authority, either socialist or market? Or is Frederic Engels correct in his common criticism that anarchists have no idea how an anarchist society would function? “[H]ow these people [the anarchists] propose to run a factory, operate a railway, or steer a ship without having in the last resort one deciding will, without single management, they of course do not tell us” (Engles, 1978: 728–9). Insofar as post-anarchism and contemporary radical politics share a similar commitment to “political contingency” and “radical possibility” they also share a similar uncertainty regarding the true alternatives they are proposing. But why is this? The post-anarchist position, that all of politics emerges from the inconsistent void of being, (from Greek: αναρχία, anarchía, “without ruler” or “without origin”) unfortunately does not seem to tell us anything about the kinds of political distributions that seem to emerge from this void and how they should be reorganized. With no certain ground (it is after all, an-archic) for determining the revolutionary object (seizer of state power, etc.), the revolutionary subject (the proletariat, etc.), the just society, or its future organizations, there is really no way to tell whether or not a particular group or organization has really articulated the “difference” post-anarchism aims to be promoting. Political action must be understood instead as “aporetic” or “preformativley contradictory” because “difference” is nothing other than the unconditioned and inconsistent unground for the emergence of radical politics as such, not any particular actual difference we may encounter. But if this is the case and “the only ontological ground is the void,” according to Newman’s paraphrase of Alain Badiou, on what condition or criteria do we say that a given political experiment is radical, reformist, authoritarian, capitalist, etc. (Newman, 2007: 14)? And what is the structure or order particular to actual radical organizations (not just possible ones) that distinguishes them from authoritarian ones? As political phenomena they have always already fallen from their radical possibility into the realm of concrete effectuation and are no longer purely possible. This does not mean, of course, that post-anarchism is unable to define radicalism as such, but merely that it has difficulty defining radicalism outside the affirmation of difference, in this account. Post-anarchist radicalism is, strictly speaking, the degree to which the phenomena defends its “possibility of becoming-other,” or “difference.” Thus, direct action groups like Peoples Global Action (PGA), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), or even the anti-globalization movement may be considered radical political groups because they are defenders of a “political potentiality” foreclosed by global capitalism, but not because of the particular way in which they are positively ordered or distributed in themselves. The politics of the possible, in this case, has occluded a politics of the actual. The “multitude,” according to Hardt and Negri, or the “counter-hegemony,” according to Laclau, are the potensia or “constituent power” of the people to rise up and defend their capacity to create a new world in the shell of the old. The slogan, **“another world is possible”** thus seems to articulate post-structuralist and radical politics well insofar as **both valorize the possibility of the people to come and criticize the authoritarianism of the present**. **But what is to be said of the actually existing infrastructure of worker cooperatives, free schools, local exchange trading systems, equalitarian kinship models, consensus community councils, land trusts, etc. beyond the monological affirmation of their ontological “difference” in a possible “world to come?”** What kinds of concrete practices are they effectuating in their decision-making, self-management, exchange, and conflict resolution and how do such practices work? What are the new conditions, elements, and agencies that are emerging and how are they viable alternatives to parliamentary capitalism? Richard J.F. Day, in his essay, “From Hegemony to Affinity: The Political Logic of the Newest Social Movements” has advanced a similar concern. While Hardt and Negri’s concept of “constituent power,” he says “thus appears to be strongly identified with constructing concrete alternatives to globalizing capital here and now, rather than appealing to state power or waiting for/bringing on the revolution,” “ultimately it is not at all clear how they perceive the practical political logic of the project of counter-Empire” (Day, 2004: 735; 736). Thus despite Hardt and Negri’s claim that, “[o]nly the multitude through its practical experimentation will offer the models and determine when and how the possible becomes real,” the question of how these real political effectuations function as actual existing alternatives to Empire is left completely unanswered (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 411). So while it may be true that the when of a singular political emergence is in some sense contingent and nomadic, the concept of the multitude ultimately says nothing about the how of alternative political organizations as they are ordered and distributed in reality. Thus it says nothing of actually existing radical politics. Day’s response to this problem is a move in the right direction but in his essay he offers only a glimpse of the post-anarchist alternatives. Instead of being satisfied with Hardt and Negri’s account of the vaguely creative power of the multitude, or Gramsci’s logic of hegemony that would centralize these heterogeneous and anarchistic social movements, Day argues instead that several of these newest social movements like Food Not Bombs, Independent Media Centers, and Reclaim the Streets offer new post-anarchist strategies of affinity and direct action: (1) grassroots organization; (2) autonomy from state centralization and instrumentalist accumulation, and; (3) a move away from strategies of demand and representation to strategies of direct action and participation. Instead of demonstrating at NBC’s news headquarters to demand that they more accurately represent race relations in the area, for instance, activists are instead creating their own independent media networks as an alternative to mainstream media. While I agree with the three characteristics Day mentions, as well as his support for a general strategy of disengagement and reconstruction (drawn from Gustav Landauer), I would like to suggest the additional importance of a few uniquely post-anarchist strategies I think can be found in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas. My motivation in this analysis is to supplement what I believe is an insufficient vision of post-anarchism based on the political philosophy of difference with an analysis that focuses instead on the more constructive alternatives offered by contemporary political struggles. The problem of radical politics today is thus **not that it lacks resistance** to all of the many forms of hierarchy and oppression (sexism, racism, ecological destruction, etc.), but that such resistance groups form **no organizational consistency** or cohesion by which to put in place **a viable alternative network** to replace the **present systems of power**.

### Piracy = Neolib Turn

#### Digital piracy is not anti-capitalist---digital pirates are primarily trying to manage capitalism differently without rejecting commodification outright----it doesn’t matter if the Aff is different because this is how their method will get adopted out-of-round

**Mueller 16**

Gavin Mueller (George Mason University). “Piracy as Labour Struggle.” *Triple-C* (Communication, Capitalism, and Critique). May 15, 2016, <https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/737/860>

The Organization of Early Digital Piracy As commercial software and computer networking increased in power and complexity, a division of labour emerged among dedicated pirates. This division was more or less self-organized, determined by the needs of commodity production, the arrangement of the productive forces within computer networks, and according to the established norms and codes of conduct of the computer underground. Technologically determinist perspectives on digital piracy, which posit that piracy is an inevitable side effect of the inadequacies of copyright in the age of digital networks, ignore this organizational element, which might be conceived as the **culture of digital piracy**. The organization of this culture, termed “The Scene,” derives its form from the BBS era and continues into the present day. Many contemporary practices are holdovers from the days of BBS pirates, and The Scene is still the ultimate origin for the majority of pirated releases of content on P2P networks (Howe 2005). Within The Scene, groups of pirates race to be the first to secure and release pirated versions of digital content, a holdover from the days when BBS boards competed for status and members. Goldman (2003, 396) has mapped out The Scene’s division of labour: These operations divide up several discrete tasks among their members, including sourcing new warez, cracking any technological protection devices, testing the cracked warez to make sure they still work, packaging the warez for easy distribution, couriering the warez to propagate the warez to other sites or throughout the Internet, performing systems administration on the computers used by the group, and managing/overseeing the operations. The first role is that of the supplier, who must acquire the content to be pirated. In the early days of BBS, this simply meant purchasing a program from the store. A BBS could rely on a well-heeled member to do this, but many boards also engaged in credit card fraud to purchase both the hardware required to run a board as well as the programs to distribute on it (Craig 2005). Eventually, pirate organizations established moles inside companies, who could provide them with advanced access to content, giving them a leg up on their pirate competition. Goldman (2003) cites cases in which employees of Intel and Microsoft were prosecuted for cooperating with pirate groups. Witt (2015) profiles a prolific music pirate who worked at an optical disc plant operated by Universal Records. Review copies have been another frequent source, as illustrated in the case of Doom II, which emerged on pirate networks weeks before its official release date (Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and de Peuter 2003), as well as the recent case of Ellen Degeneres’s screener copy of The Secret Life of Walter Mitty (Spangler 2014). These examples illustrate that pirates are workers in a double sense. Their piratical activity falls in the realm of consumption, which has its own productive character. But pirates are, for the most part, also wage labourers, many in the information technology industry, and some for the very companies their piratical practices undermine. The Scene relies upon an insurgent sector of wage labour, which transforms mundane work into games of status and ability. The copy protection on software and video games was then subverted by a cracker, a skilled programmer who alters the source code of a program, rendering copy protection useless and allowing copies to proliferate. Crackers do a kind of coding labour by disarming copy protection, but they also go further than this. Sometimes they fix bugs: Wasiak (2012) describes the actual correction of source code: “the removal of all noticed errors and glitches in the original code, since the cracked game was meant to be superior to the original in every possible way” (8). As Reunanen (2014) has put it, “the cracker system can be seen as an offspring and a mirror image of the commercial model.” The skill in programming required for cracking have led to crackers becoming a cherished part of the computer underground: they provide a model for how participants can train themselves in programming skill. As Pirate Magazine, one of the many ‘zines put together in the BBS underground, describes it, “Cracking is about learning computer programming, and the fun is in increasing skills.” It is “one of the best (and most fun) ways to learn about what makes a program work” (“Cracking Tips (Part 1)”). Once cracked, programs are transferred by couriers to other BBS systems as a sort of trophy, and a way to establish affiliations (“affilz”) among other pirate boards: a way of rewarding good work with expanded access. As the division of labour sedimented and the warez scene grew, pirated goods became more sophisticated, and incorporated a greater variety of labour. Pirates began inserting their own introductory animations and musical compositions into cracked programs. These “cracktros” served to brand releases and show off the programming and compositional skills of pirates. Crews put together “releases” (archives with the file extension .ZIP) which compressed the file size and included an NFO file containing information about the crew who created it as well as multi-colored artwork (known as ANSI). In this they mimicked, often in an irreverent way, commercial releases. This is a kind of critique of the capitalist flow of digital commodities, a way to creatively articulate the vision for an alternatively organized Internet, where the fruits of the digital economy accrue based on merit and ability, rather than ability to pay. In doing so, **software pirates did not attempt to create an anti-capitalist space, but rather a differently organized capitalist space**, with a more autonomous relationship to commodification and consumption. While members of the BBS underground dabbled in credit card fraud (often to purchase software and hardware to keep the scene running), pirated software was understood as explicitly noncommercial, and anyone caught selling pirated software was banned from the Scene (Goldman 2004). An early BBS scene magazine spells this out explicitly: What’s a pirate? COMPUTER PIRACY is copying and distribution of copyright software (warez). Pirates are hobbyists who enjoy collecting and playing with the latest programs. Most pirates enjoy collective warez, getting them running, and then generally archive them, or store them away. A PIRATE IS NOT A BOOTLEGGER. Bootleggers are to piracy what a chop-shop is to a home auto mechanic. Bootleggers are people who DEAL stolen merchandise for personal gain” (“So you want to be a pirate?” 1989). Indeed, as pirates themselves have repeatedly avowed, pirates dutifully purchase goods. Thomas and Meyer (1990), sociologists who experimented with publishing their research in the format of a pirate ‘zine textfile, argued, “software pirates [...] report spending considerably more money purchasing software than the average user. Many of these purchases are for trading, and there is a strong ethos in the pirate world that if one uses a program, one purchases it.” Subsequent research indicates that pirates tend to purchase more media goods than those who do not pirate (Karaganis 2011). Software pirates also argued that their practices spread computer literacy among young people who were unable to purchase software, but would become good consumers later in life. The .NFO files in pirate releases, which served as a kind of manifesto or newsletter for release groups, often contained exhortations to support quality software releases: “IF YOU ENJOYED THIS PRODUCT, BUY IT! SOFTWARE AUTHORS DESERVE SUPPORT!!” (Smith 2004). **In this way, piracy does not reject commodification outright.** Rather, pirates seek to manage the deluge of expensive software in an economically viable way, testing products and developing skills before deciding what to buy. This bears strong similarities to the strategy of autoreduction in 1970s Italy, during which workers resisted inflation and price increases by paying the old price. Cherki and Wieviorka (2007, 72) identify how these struggles had “stakes tied to consumption”: working class neighborhoods organized, with unions, against rate hikes for utilities and services by refusing to pay the new rates. The battle to lower prices for commodities were taken up by the formal labour movement itself, as struggles extended beyond the workplace. The class composition of pirate organizations led to specific political limitations. Only users of a certain ability—with sufficiently developed computer and networking skills—are able to participate in this autonomous strata of users. Competitive pressures among pirates mitigate some of the more egalitarian qualities of generating commons of software. Importantly, The Scene (and hacking generally) tends to be male-dominated, and even misogynist; it is also based in the wealthy nations of Europe and North America. This curtails the mass political potentials of these kinds of pirate organizations. There are further limits. While this paper has aligned piracy with a number of Marxist critiques of capitalism, **it is less clear that pirates share this critique.** As Sergio Bologna (1972, 6) noted in his analysis of the German workers’ movement, demands for self-management and the preservation of skill emerge from “a labour force inextricably linked to the technology of the labour process, with a strong sense of professional values and naturally inclined to place a high value on their function as ‘producers.’” This makes for a struggle that is difficult to generalize to the entire class of users, and tends towards hierarchical, vanguardist forms of organization focused on self-management of work. This description suits The Scene, which reproduces many of the liabilities of a labour aristocracy. Furthermore, because decommodification of intellectual property is tied to self-management of work, it tempers what may otherwise appear as egalitarian redistribution of the social product. This research suggests these tendencies were present in computer countercultures from their inception. Future research on the politics of computer-based countercultures, this essay suggests, should problematize the prioritization of skill within these cultures, especially when assessing the political potentials of such formations. Ultimately, the struggles of early pirates cannot be understood as strictly in favor of, or against, capitalist social relations. While they struggled against elements of control and management in favor of individual autonomy, and even developed organized social and cultural practices to achieve these aims, they **stopped short** of a connecting the encroachment of a regulated and deskilled Internet to the deepening subsumption of online social relations to capitalism. Subsequent research will examine how this political terrain changes when piracy moves from beyond an elite framework limited to skilled users to a mass phenomenon, aided by software platforms (such as Napster).

### DDOS Attacks Bad

#### DDOS attacks intended to prevent corporations from providing services to the US government will result in severe consequences for public health and safety, by interrupting health care services for COVID patients and air traffic control

**Stanger 21**

James Stanger (staff writer). “The risks of DDoS attacks for the public sector,” *GCN*, January 15, 2021, <https://gcn.com/2021/01/the-risks-of-ddos-attacks-for-the-public-sector/315952/>

Distributed denial of service cyberattacks have been around for decades, but they have become an even more acute problem in the last few years, especially to public institutions. Recent statistics suggest these types of attacks continue to increase in volume, as well as sophistication and severity. The number of DDoS attacks in 2020 is estimated by researchers at SecurityIntelligence to be 24% higher than in 2019. A DDoS attack involves generating malformed, problem network traffic that literally denies a particular “service” normally provided by a company. Services can include a specific website, an email server, an e-commerce system or any critical service essential for a government or nation, such as **air traffic control**. Attacks can even affect entire cloud service providers. Years ago, DDoS attacks were perpetrated by individuals who had a particular grudge, or who wished to create mischief. Motives today are far more deep-seated and can include an interest in obtaining financial reward, **making an ideological statement**, creating a geopolitical advantage or exacting revenge for a particular government action, corporate campaign or policy stance. Types of DDoS attacks can include: Volumetric: An attack that involves enormous volumes of “garbage” network traffic. These include using floods of ICMP traffic. They can also include sending out massive amounts of TCP-based traffic, such as SYN floods. Protocol-based: Sometimes these are called application-layer attacks and involve relatively -- or even very -- small amounts of traffic designed to crash a particular service. Years ago, certain Linux and Windows systems had software flaws in their networking software that could not properly process a single malformed ping packet called “the ping of death.” More recently, certain web servers fell victim to the Slowloris attack, which involves low volumes of lethal HTTP packets. The consequences of DDoS attacks on public institutions Public institutions were warned of dozens of threat alerts in 2020. Any attack poses a serious information security problem, and **consequences can be severe**. For example, a DDoS attack on financial services institutions in 2016 alone resulted in 46 major corporations that **could no longer provide services to U.S. government institutions** as well as to individuals. The same thing has happened in 2020 to non-traditional financial services, such as cryptocurrency exchanges. **During the COVID-19 crisis, health care institutions also fell prey to DDoS attacks.**

#### DDOS attacks on the healthcare sector are likely and gravely harm patients’ health

**McKeon 21**

Jill McKeon (assistant editor, Xtelligent Healthcare Media). “The Threat of Distributed Denial-Of-Service Attacks in Healthcare.” *Health IT Security*, Xtelligent Healthcare Media. November 4, 2021, https://healthitsecurity.com/features/the-threat-of-distributed-denial-of-service-attacks-in-healthcare

Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks flood a victim’s network with traffic, rendering network resources unusable. Often, DDoS attacks serve as a distraction while bad actors deploy more sinister malware on their victim’s network. For healthcare, a DDoS attack may **bar access to critical services** such as bed capacity and data sharing services, along with appointment scheduling services. In late October, the FBI released a flash alert warning organizations of Hello Kitty/FiveHands ransomware. The ransomware group is known to launch DDoS attacks on its victim’s public-facing websites if the victim does not respond quickly or refuses to pay the ransom requested in the initial attack. The pandemic created the perfect storm for ransomware and DDoS attacks, Bob Rudis, chief data scientist at Rapid7, told HealthITSecurity. “It's the perfect convergence of ease of use of the ransomware toolkits and hospitals being more overwhelmed with cases because of the pandemic,” Rudis said. “Hospitals have developed new strategies and are getting better at backing up and restoring data, which is great. But the criminals are just going to get more creative as time goes by.” While it is impossible to guarantee safety from all cyber vulnerabilities, understanding what a DDoS attack is, quantifying the risks they pose to healthcare, and investing in technical safeguards could save organizations from more serious damage. WHAT IS A DDOS ATTACK? A standard denial-of-service (DoS) attack occurs when threat actors overwhelm a network server with traffic to the point that legitimate users are unable to access information systems or devices, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) website states. The attacker will likely flood the server with illegitimate service requests containing fabricated return addresses, which will confuse the server when it tries to authenticate the requester. While the servers are preoccupied, the victim’s network resources are unusable. A DDoS attack occurs when multiple machines are working together to attack one target. Typically threat actors will use botnets—a group of hijacked devices connected to the internet—to take advantage of device vulnerabilities and gain control. Once in control, the attacker can command the botnet to conduct a DDoS on its victim. DDoS attacks allow for significantly more requests to be sent than a traditional DoS attack, increasing the attack power. “There are other ways of doing denial-of-service attacks, but they don't have to use the new ways because the existing way works really, really well for everybody,” Rudis explained. “And it's easy to do because they have thousands of bots they can pull from, which also is one reason why it is really hard to stop it.” DDoS attacks have increased in popularity as more IoT devices come online. IoT devices often have shaky IT security postures and attackers can easily compromise them. Often, DDoS attacks are used as smokescreens to distract victims while threat actors deploy more malicious infiltrations, such as ransomware. DDoS attacks have the ability to halt business operations and deny access to vital IT resources. For healthcare, this type of attack can have a **detrimental impact on patient care and safety**. WHAT RISKS DO DDOS ATTACKS POSE TO HEALTHCARE? The healthcare sector is especially vulnerable to paying a ransom because there are lives on the line. **Attackers can get a massive return on their investment** by targeting the healthcare and finance sectors, meaning they are prime targets for sophisticated attacks. A recent survey found that 80 percent of chief information security officers (CISOs) would consider paying the ransom if attacked. “The attackers are going to go after whatever they can see,” Rudis warned. “There is a huge strain on healthcare networks to either pay a ransom or have really good backup and recovery procedures. Most don't have the latter.” Bad actors often initially access healthcare networks through phishing or by taking advantage of vulnerabilities and obtaining privileges from organizations that fail to implement multi-factor authentication, Rudis explained. If an initial ransomware attempt does not yield a payment, attackers will then commit a DDoS attack on the provider’s website to further the turmoil and block access to crucial services. “For a lot of providers, their website is the way patients view upcoming appointments and **schedule COVID vaccines**. A DDoS attack will basically make the website unavailable, meaning that no one can schedule services,” Rudis continued. There is also a risk of threat actors targeting internal systems, although this is less common than a DDoS attack on external systems. “An internal DDoS is almost easier than an outside one because if they control a bunch of individual systems internally, they can do the same denial-of-service against those,” Rudis noted.

#### Cyber attacks on air traffic control cause serious loss of life

**Tsagourias 12**

Nicholas Tsagourias (Professor of International Law and Security, University of Glasgow). “Cyber attacks, self-defence and the prolem of attribution.” *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, 2012, JSTOR.

The term ‘cyber attack’ is used to describe a variety of harmful activities taking place in the cyberspace,1 but this article will concern itself only with those cyber operations whose aim is to degrade, disrupt, deny or destroy information resident in computers, or to compromise the computers themselves.2 Such attacks produce not only effects which are internal to a computer or network but also effects which are **external thereto by harming connected systems**, facilities, materials or people. For example, a **cyber attack on an air traffic control system**, altering information concerning the position of aeroplanes, produces direct effects on the air traffic control system itself by compromising its operation; but it also demonstrates external effects, by **causing air accidents resulting in material destruction and human loss**. In fact, such effects may have been the primary aim of the cyber attack.

### Piracy = Exclusionary

#### Digital piracy is exclusionary along class and gender lines, and limited to wealthy Western nations---the combination of exclusions guts solvency

**Mueller 16**

Gavin Mueller (George Mason University). “Piracy as Labour Struggle.” *Triple-C* (Communication, Capitalism, and Critique). May 15, 2016, <https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/737/860>

The **class composition** of pirate organizations led to specific political limitations. Only users of a certain ability—with sufficiently developed computer and networking skills—are able to participate in this autonomous strata of users. **Competitive pressures** among pirates mitigate some of the more egalitarian qualities of generating commons of software. Importantly, The Scene (and hacking generally) tends to be **male-dominated, and even misogynist**; it is also **based in the wealthy nations** of Europe and North America. **This curtails the mass political potentials of these kinds of pirate organizations.**

### Antitrust Turn---1NC

#### The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

### Malware DA

#### Digital piracy increases malware spread with high probability---the Aff’s method will enable people with terrible intentions to just make money for themselves on the side, which turns the neoliberal mentality

**Smith 12**

Gordon Smith (staff writer). “Security firm warms of malware risks in pirated software,” *Silicon Republic*, April 5, 2012, <https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/security-firm-warns-of-malware-risks-in-pirated-software>

Internet users have been warned against downloading illegal versions of software because many cracked programs carry a malicious payload designed to infect computers. The warning follows a survey released yesterday which found that 67pc of Irish people say they use legitimate software – either paid applications or free, open-source programmes. That figure suggests that up to 33pc could be using pirated software, which is available on peer-to-peer networks. Security software company ESET Ireland commissioned Amárach research to poll more than 1,000 people across Ireland about their software use. The survey found 15pc of respondents did not know if their software is pirated. Almost one in 10 (9pc) said they used pirated programmes, such as a cracked version of Adobe Photoshop, while 6pc use pirated antivirus software and 5pc use pirated games. The figures don’t indicate whether the same people answered yes to multiple questions about using cracked software. Explaining why a security provider like ESET is interested in software piracy rates, the company’s IT security and cybercrime analyst Urban Schrott said it’s because paid software made available for free online is often used as a way to spread malware. “The majority of cracked software comes as a package of some sorts and the malware can be part of the de-packer, the cracked .exe itself or as some process within the programme,” he told Siliconrepublic.com. “Also, many ‘free software’ websites themselves are hosted by shady companies and will try to infect you with drive-by malware anywhere in the process of finding and downloading the cracked software from their site.” ‘Don’t download illegal stuff’ Asked what advice he would give to people who may be tempted by getting software without having to pay for it, Schrott warned: “Don’t download illegal stuff. **It’s not given to you for free by someone nice, because they like you and want to give you something for free, but by someone with a malicious intent, because they want to make money for themselves using the free stuff as bait**.” The connection between pirated software and malicious tools has been known anecdotally in security circles for some time, but data has been difficult to obtain. Last year, the prominent security blogger Brian Krebs published information from antivirus company Immunet which found a high probability that cracked software available on file-sharing networks was responsible for spreading malware. Krebs wrote at the time: “…downloading pirated software and software cracks is among the fastest and likeliest ways to infect your computer with something that ultimately hands control over of your PC to someone else”. ESET’s research provided a further statistical breakdown of results, showing that legitimate software use is lowest among the 25-34 age group at just 51pc, whereas 83pc of people over 55 don’t use anything pirated. Nine out of 10 Dublin residents know what software they use, with only 10pc claiming they don’t, while in Munster 19pc answered they don’t know whether their software is pirated. Use of cracked software is almost twice as high among men (12pc) than women (7pc), the research found. The survey was anonymous, and ESET said this would suggest that people answered truthfully. “The vast majority being users of legal software is good news. The availability of free, open-source software also makes things easier for many users. But the combined percentage of people using pirated software is still a concern, as is the high number of people that just don’t know if their software is legit,” said Schrott. If the 67pc figure is accurate, it suggests that up to 33pc of the population could be using pirated software – a level that remains consistent with figures from 2009 which were reported by the Business Software Alliance. Then, the piracy watchdog reported rates of 34pc illegal software use in Ireland, and the ESET research appears to indicate that little has changed in the meantime.

### Piracy Discourages Creative Content

#### Piracy has harmful supply-side effects---it discourages the incentive to produce creative content because producers will no longer be able to recoup their costs

**Smith et al 17**

Michael D. Smith, Brett Danaher, and Rahul Telang (Technology Policy Institute). “How Piracy Can Hurt Consumers.” *Technology Policy Institute*, December 6, 2017, <https://techpolicyinstitute.org/publications/intellectual-property/how-piracy-can-hurt-consumers/>

The public debate about Internet piracy is typically seen as pitting the interests of producers versus the interests of consumers. On one hand, the empirical evidence is clear: piracy hurts producers by reducing the amount of money they can make from their creative efforts. But it is easy to see why consumers might like piracy: those who had been willing to pay the market price can now get it for free, and those who hadn’t been willing to pay the market price can now consume content they wouldn’t have been able to access otherwise. The problem with this way of looking at piracy is that it focuses solely on demand. **But there’s another side to all of this: supply, specifically how piracy can affect both the quantity and quality** of movies that are supplied to consumers. People tend to neglect this question, but we believe it’s going to become increasingly important to answer in the years ahead. Consider the number of movies made. For movies, especially in the digital age, the fixed costs of production are substantial, but the marginal costs of reproduction are not. Think of the budgets associated with blockbuster films, which can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. If piracy lowers the expected revenues of a film to a point below the fixed cost of its production, then the film will not be made, and if that happens the social-welfare benefit of bringing it to market disappears. In that case producers and consumers lose. Does piracy actually make producers less willing or able to create some types of new creative works? That, of course, is the big question. To stimulate more discussion of it, we recently published a paper in the George Mason University Law Review that looked into how piracy seems to be affecting movie production. We first determined, pretty easily, that supply has not decreased since the era of meaningful Internet movie piracy began, roughly in 2007. Both Hollywood and independent producers continue to churn out films. This isn’t surprising, given all of the new content-creation and content-distribution technologies that have developed alongside the rise of digital piracy. But that’s not the end of the story. As we discuss in the paper, it’s very possible that when considered by itself piracy is causing a number of subtle distortions in the production of new films, among them a possible retreat from riskier movies, an increasing need to accept funding with creative conditions attached, and a reduced ability to fund expensive but valuable creative elements—for example, expensive CGI scenes and other special effects. To the extent that these distortions actually exist, how can we start to explore potential effects? One way, we decided, would be to study the difference in supply of movies in low-piracy and high-piracy settings, before and after the rise of Internet piracy. So we attacked that problem in a simple and limited way: by studying the number of Academy Award–winning films financed by higher-piracy and lower-piracy countries. Winning an Academy Award is just one indicator of a movie’s quality, of course. But to us it seemed like a decent proxy for quality, however imperfect, that we could use in trying to measure the effect of piracy on supply. If piracy affects the supply of movies in a given country, we reasoned, that will mean less money available in those countries to make movies, which will reduce the quality of the movies that are made—and that, in turn, will diminish the odds of movies from that country winning Academy Awards. We began our study by compiling a list of all movies from 1995 to 2014 that had won at least one Academy Award, noting in each case which country or countries had financed the movie. And when we studied that list, we found data suggesting that piracy does indeed affect film quality. In Italy and Mexico, two countries in which piracy has strongly influenced demand, the number of awards decreased significantly from the pre-piracy to the post-piracy period, whereas in the U.K. and France, two countries in which piracy has had a smaller effect on demand, the number of awards won increased meaningfully. We don’t pretend that this simple comparison proves that piracy is having a harmful effect on supply in the movie business. In some of the other countries we studied, we observed less of a correlation between piracy and the number of Academy Awards won. Future researchers will obviously need to study this question in broader and more sophisticated ways. That said, the correlations we found are consistent with the hypothesis that piracy adversely affects both demand and supply, and has caused investment in culturally important films to drop, and is also consistent with our prior research analyzing how piracy impacted Bollywood films in the 1980s. If others end up confirming these correlations, then we will have to admit something important: When it comes to copyright protection, producers and consumers are far more aligned in their interests than is commonly recognized: **both will benefit in the long run if piracy is converted to legal consumption.**

#### Creative production turns the case---it’s key to resisting neoliberalism

**Watts 17**

Richard Watts (staff writer). “Freeing the arts from the yoke of neoliberalism,” Arts Hub, July 18, 2017, <https://www.artshub.com.au/news/features/freeing-the-arts-from-the-yoke-of-neoliberalism-254094-2356752/>

Focusing on the aesthetic, cultural and transcendent values of art will help to encourage the next generation of practitioners further divest themselves from the neoliberal model, Rankin believes. ‘If we look at the vast body of creativity and what is happening every day from the second we wake up – we get up and we have a cup of coffee from our favourite mug; we listen to a radiophonic work coming via the ABC; we go onto ArtsHub and see what a literary genius has just written; we touch a favourite handmade carpet – we begin a whole process that is cultural every day,’ he said. ‘The best point to begin is to say the number one question, the first question that an artist utters should not be about funding – and that the funded moment, the business moment, the way in which you want a transaction with an audience to involve money, is only one small part of cultural activity. ‘We’ve got to encourage younger artists to get out of that kind of feedback loop and think more broadly about the question: how does every aspect of the community engage with the arts? And therefore, how do we release funding for creative activity out of the whole of life and the whole of government and the whole of the corporate world? Suddenly that’s a very different equation,’ Rankin explained. He also stressed the importance of connecting artists with the broader community – of breaking out of the familiar world of gallery openings, feedback from peers, and funding cycles. ‘In suburbs around the country, in ugly areas of the justice system, in the health industries in Central Australia, there are vast areas in which artists can work in deeply satisfying ways in communities who have a craving, a need for cultural and creative practice because their cultural rights have so long been dismissed by agencies like the Australia Council. ‘There is so much to do and so much potential to fund it in all kinds of unusual ways, and yet we are trained to think about these dried up teats that are the arts funding bodies,’ Rankin said.

# 2NC/1NR

## CP

### Regs Key

#### The aff fails without the CP

Paul Mason 16, Visiting Professor at the University of Wolverhampton, BA in Politics from the University of Sheffield, Postgraduate Degree from the Second Viennese School at the University of Sheffield, PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future, Kindle Edition, p. 6-17

What started in 2008 as an economic crisis morphed into a social crisis, leading to mass unrest; and now, as revolutions turn into civil wars, creating military tension between nuclear superpowers, it has become a crisis of the global order.

There are, on the face of it, only two ways it can end. In the first scenario, the global elite clings on, imposing the cost of crisis on to workers, pensioners and the poor over the next ten or twenty years. The global order – as enforced by the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organisation – survives, but in a weakened form. The cost of saving globalization is borne by the ordinary people of the developed world. But growth stagnates.

In the second scenario, the consensus breaks. Parties of the hard right and left come to power as ordinary people refuse to pay the price of austerity. Instead, states then try to impose the costs of the crisis on each other. Globalization falls apart, the global institutions become powerless and in the process the conflicts that have burned these past twenty years – drug wars, post-Soviet nationalism, jihadism, uncontrolled migration and resistance to it – light a fire at the centre of the system. In this scenario, lip-service to international law evaporates; torture, censorship, arbitrary detention and mass surveillance become the regular tools of statecraft. This is a variant of what happened in the 1930s and there is no guarantee it cannot happen again.

In both scenarios, the serious impacts of climate change, demographic ageing and population growth kick in around the year 2050. If we can’t create a sustainable global order and restore economic dynamism, the decades after 2050 will be chaos.

So I want to propose an alternative: first, we save globalization by ditching neoliberalism; then we save the planet – and rescue ourselves from turmoil and inequality – by moving beyond capitalism itself.

Ditching neoliberalism is the easy part. There’s a growing consensus among protest movements, radical economists and radical political parties in Europe as protest movements, radical economists and radical political parties in Europe as to how you do it: suppress high finance, reverse austerity, invest in green energy and promote high-waged work.

But then what?

As the Greek experience demonstrates, any government that defies austerity will instantly clash with the global institutions that protect the 1 per cent. After the radical left party Syriza won the election in January 2015, the European Central Bank, whose job was to promote the stability of Greek banks, pulled the plug on those banks, triggering a €20 billion run on deposits. That forced the left-wing government to choose between bankruptcy and submission. You will find no minutes, no voting records, no explanation for what the ECB did. It was left to the right-wing German newspaper Stern to explain: they had ‘smashed’ Greece.3 It was done, symbolically, to reinforce the central message of neoliberalism that there is no alternative; that all routes away from capitalism end in the kind of disaster that befell the Soviet Union; and that a revolt against capitalism is a revolt against a natural and timeless order.

The current crisis not only spells the end of the neoliberal model, it is a symptom of the longer-term mismatch between market systems and an economy based on information. The aim of this book is to explain why replacing capitalism is no longer a utopian dream, how the basic forms of a postcapitalist economy can be found within the current system, and how they could be expanded rapidly.

Neoliberalism is the doctrine of uncontrolled markets: it says that the best route to prosperity is individuals pursuing their own self-interest, and the market is the only way to express that self-interest. It says the state should be small (except for its riot squad and secret police); that financial speculation is good; that inequality is good; that the natural state of humankind is to be a bunch of ruthless individuals, competing with each other.

Its prestige rests on tangible achievements: in the past twenty-five years, neoliberalism has triggered the biggest surge in development the world has ever seen, and it unleashed an exponential improvement in core information technologies. But in the process, it has revived inequality to a state close to that of 100 years ago and has now triggered a survival-level event.

The civil war in Ukraine, which brought Russian special forces to the banks of the Dniestr; the triumph of ISIS in Syria and Iraq; the rise of fascist parties in the Dniestr; the triumph of ISIS in Syria and Iraq; the rise of fascist parties in Europe; the paralysis of NATO as its populations withhold consent for military intervention – these are not problems separate from the economic crisis. They are signs that the neoliberal order has failed.

Over the past two decades, millions of people have resisted neoliberalism but in general the resistance failed. Beyond all the tactical mistakes, and the repression, the reason is simple: free-market capitalism is a clear and powerful idea, while the forces opposing it looked like they were defending something old, worse and incoherent.

Among the 1 per cent, neoliberalism has the power of a religion: the more you practise it, the better you feel – and the richer you become. Even among the poor, once the system was in full swing, to act in any other way but according to neoliberal strictures became irrational: you borrow, you duck and dive around the edges of the tax system, you stick to the pointless rules imposed at work.

And for decades the opponents of capitalism have revelled in their own incoherence. From the anti-globalization movement of the 1990s through to Occupy and beyond, the movement for social justice has rejected the idea of a coherent programme in favour of ‘One No, Many Yes-es’. The incoherence is logical, if you think the only alternative is what the twentieth century left called ‘socialism’. Why fight for a big change if it’s only a regression – towards state control and economic nationalism, to economies that work only if everyone behaves the same way or submits to a brutal hierarchy? In turn, the absence of a clear alternative explains why most protest movements never win: in their hearts they don’t want to. There’s even a term for it in the protest movement: ‘refusal to win’.4

To replace neoliberalism we need something just as powerful and effective; not just a bright idea about how the world could work but a new, holistic model that can run itself and tangibly deliver a better outcome. It has to be based on micro-mechanisms, not diktats or policies; it has to work spontaneously. In this book, I make the case that there is a clear alternative, that it can be global, and that it can deliver a future substantially better than the one capitalism will be offering by the mid-twenty-first century.

It’s called postcapitalism.

Capitalism is more than just an economic structure or a set of laws and institutions. It is the whole system – social, economic, demographic, cultural, ideological – needed to make a developed society function through markets and private ownership. That includes companies, markets and states. But it also includes criminal gangs, secret power networks, miracle preachers in a Lagos slum, rogue analysts on Wall Street. Capitalism is the Primark factory that collapsed in Bangladesh and it is the rioting teenage girls at the opening of the Primark store in London, overexcited at the prospect of bargain clothes.

By studying capitalism as a whole system, we can identify a number of its fundamental features. Capitalism is an organism: it has a lifecycle – a beginning, a middle and an end. It is a complex system, operating beyond the control of individuals, governments and even superpowers. It creates outcomes that are often contrary to people’s intentions, even when they are acting rationally. Capitalism is also a learning organism: it adapts constantly, and not just in small increments. At major turning points, it morphs and mutates in response to danger, creating patterns and structures barely recognizable to the generation that came before. And its most basic survival instinct is to drive technological change. If we consider not just info-tech but food production, birth control or global health, the past twenty-five years have probably seen the greatest upsurge in human capability ever. But the technologies we’ve created are not compatible with capitalism – not in its present form and maybe not in any form. Once capitalism can no longer adapt to technological change, postcapitalism becomes necessary. When behaviours and organizations adapted to exploiting technological change appear spontaneously, postcapitalism becomes possible.

That, in short, is the argument of this book: that capitalism is a complex, adaptive system which has reached the limits of its capacity to adapt.

This, of course, stands miles apart from mainstream economics. In the boom years, economists started to believe the system that had emerged after 1989 was permanent – the perfect expression of human rationality, with all its problems solvable by politicians and central bankers tweaking control dials marked ‘fiscal and monetary policy’.

When they considered the possibility that the new technology and the old forms of society were mismatched, economists assumed society would simply remould itself around technology. Their optimism was justified because such adaptations have happened in the past. But today the adaptation process is adaptations have happened in the past. But today the adaptation process is stalled.

Information is different from every previous technology. As I will show, its spontaneous tendency is to dissolve markets, destroy ownership and break down the relationship between work and wages. And that is the deep background to the crisis we are living through.

If I am right we have to admit that for most of the past century the left has misunderstood what the end of capitalism would look like. The old left’s aim was the forced destruction of market mechanisms. The force would be applied by the working class, either at the ballot box or on the barricades. The lever would be the state. The opportunity would come through frequent episodes of economic collapse. Instead, over the past twenty-five years, it is the left’s project that has collapsed. The market destroyed the plan; individualism replaced collectivism and solidarity; the massively expanded workforce of the world looks like a ‘proletariat’, but no longer thinks or behaves purely as one.

If you lived through all this, and hated capitalism, it was traumatic. But in the process, technology has created a new route out, which the remnants of the old left – and all other forces influenced by it – have either to embrace or die.

Capitalism, it turns out, will not be abolished by forced-march techniques. It will be abolished by creating something more dynamic that exists, at first, almost unseen within the old system, but which breaks through, reshaping the economy around new values, behaviours and norms. As with feudalism 500 years ago, capitalism’s demise will be accelerated by external shocks and shaped by the emergence of a new kind of human being. And it has started.

Postcapitalism is possible because of three impacts of the new technology in the past twenty-five years.

First, information technology has reduced the need for work, blurred the edges between work and free time and loosened the relationship between work and wages.

Second, information goods are corroding the market’s ability to form prices correctly. That is because markets are based on scarcity while information is abundant. The system’s defence mechanism is to form monopolies on a scale not seen in the past 200 years – yet these cannot last.

Third, we’re seeing the spontaneous rise of collaborative production: goods, services and organizations are appearing that no longer respond to the dictates of services and organizations are appearing that no longer respond to the dictates of the market and the managerial hierarchy. The biggest information product in the world – Wikipedia – is made by 27,000 volunteers, for free, abolishing the encyclopaedia business and depriving the advertising industry of an estimated $3 billion a year in revenue.

Almost unnoticed, in the niches and hollows of the market system, whole swathes of economic life are beginning to move to a different rhythm. Parallel currencies, time banks, cooperatives and self-managed spaces have proliferated, barely noticed by the economics profession, and often as a direct result of the shattering of old structures after the 2008 crisis.

New forms of ownership, new forms of lending, new legal contracts: a whole business subculture has emerged over the past ten years, which the media has dubbed the ‘sharing economy’. Buzzterms such as the ‘commons’ and ‘peer- production’ are thrown around, but few have bothered to ask what this means for capitalism itself.

I believe it offers an escape route – but only if these micro-level projects are nurtured, promoted and protected by a massive change in what governments do. This must in turn be driven by a change in our thinking about technology, ownership and work itself. When we create the elements of the new system we should be able to say to ourselves and others: this is no longer my survival mechanism, my bolt-hole from the neoliberal world, this is a new way of living in the process of formation.

In the old socialist project, the state takes over the market, runs it in favour of the poor instead of the rich, then moves key areas of production out of the market and into a planned economy. The one time it was tried, in Russia after 1917, it didn’t work. Whether it could have worked is a good question, but a dead one.

Today the terrain of capitalism has changed: it is global, fragmentary, geared to small-scale choices, temporary work and multiple skill-sets. Consumption has become a form of self-expression – and millions of people have a stake in the finance system that they did not have before.

With the new terrain, the old path is lost. But a different path has opened up. Collaborative production, using network technology to produce goods and services that work only when they are free, or shared, defines the route beyond the market system. It will need the state to create the framework, and the postcapitalist sector might coexist with the market sector for decades. But it is postcapitalist sector might coexist with the market sector for decades. But it is happening.

Networks restore ‘granularity’ to the postcapitalist project; that is, they can be the basis of a non-market system that replicates itself, which does not need to be created afresh every morning on the computer screen of a commissar.

### Decentralized Finance

#### It’s strategic duplicity that implodes capitalism from within. Direct rejection fails.

Dr. Brian Massumi 18, Professor in the Department of Communication Sciences at the University of Montréal, Ph.D. in French Literature from Yale University, and Dr. Erin Manning, Professor of Philosophy and Cinema at Concordia University, Ph.D. in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii, “A Cryptoeconomy of Affect”, The New Inquiry, 5/14/2018, https://thenewinquiry.com/a-cryptoeconomy-of-affect/

It would be very naive of us to think you could just walk out of capitalism. We’re not that naive. Neoliberalism is our natural environment. We therefore operate with what we call strategic duplicity. This involves recognizing what works in the systems we work against. Which means: We don’t just oppose them head on. We work with them, strategically, while nurturing an alien logic that moves in very different directions. One of the things we know that the university does well is that it attracts really interesting people. The university can facilitate meetings that can change lives. But systemically, it fails. And the systemic failure is getting more and more acute. And so what we imagine is that the Institute, assisted by the 3E Process Seed Bank, will create a new space that might overlap with some of the things the university does well, without being a part of it (or being subsumed by its logic).

MASSUMI.— Going back to the question of value, we want to create an economy around the platform that does not follow any of the usual economic principles. There will be no individual ownership or shares. There will be no units of account, no currency or tokens used internally. The model of activity will not be transactional. Individual interest will not be used as an incentivizer. What there will be is a complex space of relation for people to create intensities of experience together, in emergent excess over what they could have created working separately, or in traditional teams. It’s meant to be self-organizing, with no separate administrative structure or hierarchy, and even no formal decision-making rules. It’s anarchistic in that sense, but through mobilizing a surplus of organizing potential, rather than lacking organization. You could also call it communistic, in the sense that there is no individual value holding. Everything is common.

MANNING.— Undercommon.

MASSUMI.— Yes, undercommonly. The undercommons is Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s word for emergent collectivity, which is one of our inspirations. We want to foster emergence and process, but at the same time find ways of making it sustainable. That means that the strategic duplicity has to extend to the economy as we currently know it. We have to be parasitical to the capitalist economy, while operating according to a logic that is totally alien to it.

What we’re thinking of is making the collaborative process moving through the platform function according to the radically anti-capitalist principles we were just talking about, centering on the collective production of surplus values of life, and separating that from the dominant economy by a membrane. A membrane creates a separation, but at the same time allows for movements across. It has a certain porosity. The idea is that we would find ways, associated with the affect-o-meter we were describing earlier, to register qualitative shifts in the creative process as it moves over its formative thresholds, and moves back and forth between online operations and offline events. What would be registered is the affective intensity of the production of surplus value of life, its ebbs and flows. The membrane would consist in a translation of those qualitative flows into a numerical expression, which would feed into a cryptocurrency. Basically, we’d be mining crypto with collaborative creative energies—monetizing emergent collectivity. The currency would be “backed” by the confidence we could build in our ability to keep the creative process going and spin it off into other projects, as evidenced by the activities of the Three Ecologies Institute as an experiment in alter-education.

On the side of the membrane facing the monetary economy, we would be producing a recognizable, quantifiable movement of value. But the membrane would shelter the creative process going on inside the platform from being colonized by that logic. We’d try to have the best of both worlds. It would be essential that the currency not be just a speculative vehicle that joins the crowd of coins. Our economic space would have to inhabit an ecology of other economic spaces experimenting with adapting blockchain and post-blockchain autonomous organization to cooperative endeavors. The key, once again, is finding workable solutions to the problem of how to use qualitative analysis to register movements of creative intensity—how to coax numbers into an alliance with qualities of experience. There is a new concept being developed by Nora Bateson that she calls “warm data” that has a similar goal, in relation to basic science, that we’d like to hook into.

MARC.— You want to use blockchain to create a parasitic economy that reappropriates speculative finance to generate profit from collaborative events. You are working within the immaterial level that the movement to occupy public spaces only gestured at, and uses the collaborative spirit common to any movement. Do you consider yourself to be “occupying” the abstract?

MANNING.— If we’re “occupying an abstraction,” we’re doing it in a way that is extraterritorial. All of this is a thought experiment that we want to help sow, but needs to be continued by others, and with others. It will be interesting if it manages to produce process seeds that get away from us and end up going beyond anything that we could have imagined. I’m not sure what Brian would say, but my feeling is that if we’re occupying anything, it’s the imagination. The postcapitalist imagination.

MASSUMI.— Another way of saying it is that we are talking about creating what’s often been called a temporary autonomous zone, but recognizing that we’re all complicit with capital, and not pretending we can just step outside that and go our merry way. If you do that, you only end up carrying unexamined presuppositions with you, and everything breaks down. We want to work from and with that complicity, using strategic duplicity. That doesn’t mean being deceptive. It means working in two registers at once.

We want to create a temporary autonomous zone (TAZ), following anarcho-communist logic, while at the same time being able to articulate it to the existing neoliberal economy, because like it or not, those are the conditions under which we live, and its grip is so tentacular, reaching not only all around us but inside of us, that you have to work hard and with great technique to start loosening the grip. You have to find ways of inhabiting the present, while setting off sparks of futurity that prefigure a postcapitalist world to come. So it’s an occupation in the sense that it’s a cohabitation. The TAZ isn’t a world apart. It’s a pore in the world as it is, in which something else can grow. It’s a relational space that you can enter without the conceit that you’re leaving the existing world. It starts by supplementing, rather than purporting to replace right away. Hopefully that supplementation grows and takes more and more of our cohabitation in, to the point that it can rival the dominant economy.

## Case

### A2: Bifo

#### The aff results in lifeboat communism, where the privileged retreat into theoretical enclaves insulated from the predatory violence of capitalism and political engagement becomes stifled

Lear 12 — Ben Lear, Viewpoitn Magazine Editor, “Lifeboat Communism – A Review of Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s After the Future,” May 18 2012, <http://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/>, wcp)

What does the end of the future mean for rad­i­cal pol­i­tics? It is at this point that Bifo’s argu­ment becomes prob­lem­atic. In an argu­ment that inter­sects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see “Com­mu­nism as a neces­sity in the col­lapse of cap­i­tal.” Dis­tant from the vol­un­tarism of pre­vi­ous forms of Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics, this “post-growth Com­mu­nism” will be best under­stood as a nec­es­sary response to capital’s refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the “oppor­tu­nity” to work, with wel­fare sys­tems dis­man­tled, Bifo argues that we will wit­ness the pro­lif­er­a­tion of zones of auton­omy respond­ing to the needs of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and super­flu­ous social body. Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics will emerge from an exo­dus, both vol­un­tary and com­pul­sory, from a stag­nat­ing and increas­ingly preda­tory state-capital nexus. This exo­dus is both social, in the devel­op­ment of an alter­na­tive infra­struc­ture, and per­sonal, in the with­drawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semi­otic econ­omy. Bifo aban­dons hope in col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion at the level of the political. Bifo’s pol­i­tics could be described as a kind of “lifeboat com­mu­nism.” As the cri­sis rip­ples, mutates, and deep­ens, Bifo sees the role of com­mu­nism as the cre­ation of spaces of sol­i­dar­ity to blunt the worst effects of the cri­sis of social repro­duc­tion. Gone is the demand for a bet­ter world for all, the lib­er­a­tion of our col­lec­tive social wealth, or the unlock­ing of the social poten­tials of tech­nol­ogy. Rather, Bifo’s pol­i­tics are based around insu­lat­ing a nec­es­sar­ily small por­tion of soci­ety from the dic­tates of cap­i­tal. By with­draw­ing from the polit­i­cal sphere, we accept the like­li­hood of los­ing the final scraps of the wel­fare state and con­cede the ter­rain of the polit­i­cal to zom­bie pol­i­tics and preda­tory cap­i­tal. Rather than seek­ing new forms of orga­ni­za­tion to re-enter the polit­i­cal stage, Bifo seems to sug­gest that we seek shel­ter beneath it as best we can. This shy­ing away from the polit­i­cal stage is the weak­ness at the heart of the book. Recent erup­tions of polit­i­cal strug­gle have cap­tured the col­lec­tive imag­i­na­tion because they demon­strate that polit­i­cal con­tes­ta­tion is still pos­si­ble today, in spite of the obsta­cles Bifo has described. The Occupy move­ment and the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and North Africa have res­onated with all those who still have hope in col­lec­tive strug­gle. Although these move­ments have encoun­tered vary­ing prob­lems, to which we must develop solu­tions, they dis­pel the idea of an unchange­able present. The cur­rent block­ages to suc­cess­ful organ­is­ing have been shown to be *strate­gic and tac­ti­cal*, not ter­mi­nal. Mis­di­ag­nos­ing the cur­rent iner­tia of post-political pub­lic life as a ter­mi­nal con­di­tion leads the left towards an evac­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal, while we should instead reassert its pri­macy.  If we aban­don any hope of fight­ing in, against, and beyond the exist­ing archi­tec­ture of the state and cap­i­tal, and instead seek refuge in small com­munes, and go-slow prac­tices, we aban­don all real hope of a gen­er­al­ized, or gen­er­al­iz­able, eman­ci­pa­tory pol­i­tics. Although Bifo’s analy­sis of the dif­fi­cul­ties of col­lec­tive action res­onates with all of us who have attempted to orga­nize strug­gles in the past few decades, the pro­posal for a sim­ple with­drawal from cap­i­tal­ism is a bleak pol­i­tics indeed – which, at its most opti­mistic, calls for an orderly default by por­tions of the pro­le­tariat. The hori­zons of com­mu­nist pol­i­tics appear much nar­rower when cap­i­tal­ism is no longer seen as the repos­i­tory of a vast store of social wealth await­ing col­lec­tive redis­tri­b­u­tion, but rather rede­fined as an unas­sail­able site of uni­ver­sal and per­ma­nent aus­ter­ity com­bined with widen­ing social redundancy. It is hard to imag­ine a net­work of self-organized projects and sys­tems sup­port­ing the major­ity of the pop­u­la­tion in the con­text of an increas­ingly preda­tory cap­i­tal­ism. Emerg­ing from the and iso­lated left­ist scenes, this lifeboat com­mu­nism will by its very nature have a lim­ited car­ry­ing capac­ity, as the anar­chist expe­ri­ence in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo calls for will undoubt­edly be too small and makeshift to har­bor us all. The cri­sis is twofold. It is a cri­sis of cap­i­tal­ist prof­itabil­ity, and of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and sur­plus global pro­le­tariat whose repro­duc­tion (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the pro­lif­er­a­tion of com­munes, squats, food co-ops, file shar­ers, urban gar­den­ers, and vol­un­tary health ser­vices will bring forth a new, bet­ter world. But while the cur­rent seem­ingly post-political sit­u­a­tion throws up mas­sive obsta­cles to orga­niz­ing, there is still a poten­tial for col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion. The cap­i­tal­ist state, racked by its own legit­i­macy cri­sis and weekly polit­i­cal scan­dals, is more vul­ner­a­ble than it appears. We need only recall the period of unex­pected hope built by stu­dents in Britain, occu­piers in Oak­land, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Mid­dle East dur­ing the past two years. These move­ments were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but along­side their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behav­iour and to forge new tac­ti­cal and organ­i­sa­tional weapons for strug­gle. Bifo’s con­tri­bu­tion is a timely and chal­leng­ing one, but it ulti­mately leads us back towards a DIY cul­ture and “out­reach” pol­i­tics. As our move­ments come to terms with these lim­its, we must also hold onto the belief that lux­ury for all is pos­si­ble. The social poten­tial of unfilled blocks of flats, emerg­ing tech­nolo­gies like 3D-printing, and the desires of the mil­lions of under­em­ployed, should remind us of this. This will not be pos­si­ble with­out a col­lec­tive strug­gle against the state and the demands of cap­i­tal, one which simul­ta­ne­ously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat pol­i­tics is both pre­ma­ture and a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Bifo cor­rectly analy­ses the cur­rent con­junc­ture – clearly iden­ti­fy­ing the post-political state, the weak­ness of the Left, the cri­sis of prof­itabil­ity and new forms of labour, and their impact on the sub­ject – his polit­i­cal pre­scrip­tions lead us in the wrong direc­tion. Just as Bifo does, we place the strug­gle against work at the cen­ter; but we can also seek to lib­er­ate social wealth, rather than insu­late a lucky few from the rav­ages of cap­i­tal. Rather than “No Future,” we must raise a dif­fer­ent ban­ner: “The future’s here, it just needs reorganizing.”

### Piracy = Neolib Turn

#### Digital piracy is equally likely to maintain and strengthen neoliberalism---even if pirates attack pre-existing capitalist institutions, they’re only plugging in the holes to become the future Big Tech CEOs---that also proves that the Aff isn’t a successful method of antitrust

**Hall 9**

Gary Hall (Research Professor of Media and Performing Arts and Director of the Centre for Disruptive Media at Coventry University) “Introduction: Pirate Philosophy,” *Culture Machine* 10, 2009, <https://culturemachine.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/367-558-1-PB-1.pdf>

The meaning of piracy is not finished or closed for us here, then. Piracy can be understood and used in very different and at times actively opposed ways. Digital piracy may have the potential to make it possible for us to raise radical questions for ideas of the subject, the individual, the human and so forth – as I argue it does, if only we can take the chance it affords. Yet as the above quote from Stalder demonstrates, it can also be employed to defend, support and promote such humanist ideas. Witness, too, the way in which Adrian Johns is able to show in this issue how much of ‘[t]oday’s pirate philosophy is a moral philosophy through and through’, one which ‘has to do centrally with convictions about freedom, rights, duties, obligations, and the like’. The inspiration for much contemporary piracy comes for him not merely from ‘Stewart Brand and the Whole earth catalog, but Friedrich **Hayek** and – especially – Ronald Coase and their assaults on public media’ and the established, paternalistic state funded, regulated and controlled broadcasting institutions and monopolies such as the BBC in the UK. It is a philosophy that has its historical roots very much in a ‘marked libertarian ideology’: one of the UK’s pirate radio ships of the 1960s was actually called the Laissez Faire. Furthermore, it is a philosophy which ‘helped to make Thatcherism in particular what it was’. **Pirates and piracy can even be pro-neoliberal capitalism**, as Johns’ reference to Thatcherism implies, and as Matt Mason amply demonstrates in his book, The Pirate’s Dilemma (2008). Many of the rebellious pirates Mason discusses go on to be successful businessmen and entrepreneurs. In fact, **pirates are very much ‘taking over the good ship capitalism’, according to Mason, ‘but they’re not here to sink it. Instead they will plug the holes, keep it afloat, and propel it forward. The mass market will still be here for a long while’.** Interestingly, Mason cites the publication of his own book in a decidedly non-piratical, non-digital form as ‘living proof of that’ (2008: 239). Secondly, and following on from the above, if this issue of Culture Machine is distinguished by its **refusal to assign an intrinsic or essential value, politics or meaning to piracy**, it is also distinguished by the theoretically rigorous nature of much of its engagement with the subject. As you may already have gathered, piracy is not a sacred cow for us here. While we are extremely interested in piracy, its potentialities as well as its limitations, we are not uncritical of it, nor of the various pirate philosophies – be they humanist, (copy)Left, Marxist, libertarian or neo-liberal – that underpin it.

### DDOS Attacks Bad

#### More ev

Samantha Cossick 19 [Former Senior Content Strategist, "If The Internet Shutdown For a Day, What Would Happen?," accessed 2-19-2022, https://www.allconnect.com/blog/what-would-happen-if-internet-down-for-day, hec]

Hospitals Advances in digital technology and the Internet of Things are revolutionizing healthcare. For instance, telemedicine in rural communities means that stroke patients who require tPA treatment (which must be approved by a neurologist and administered within a few hours of symptom onset) can be seen electronically by a neurologist, given medication sooner and have their chances of recovery improved. Additionally, Electronic Medical Records (EMR) and patient portals — with the ability to message your doctor directly — mean patients are empowered with immediate access to their medical records and care team. But what if all systems went down? In May, when the internet went down at Phoenix Children’s Hospital for several hours, it was reported that all “systems were down and patient records were inaccessible.” Luckily, in this case, the outage only lasted a few hours and no patients were in harm’s way. But, Dr. Andrew Carroll, medical director and CEO of Atembis in Chandler, AZ, made a very good point to ABC15: “I think just about everything at a hospital is dependent on the internet at this point. You flip the switch, things like your lab work that was done that morning, your radiology studies may not be available, what you did yesterday may not be available.” Access to healthcare information could very well mean the difference between life and death in some cases, which is why most hospitals across the country have redundancies built into their processes and run drills for these exact scenarios.

#### Conflict escalation

Jonathan Strickland updated in 21 ["What Would Happen if the Internet Collapsed?," accessed 2-19-2022, https://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet-collapse.htm, hec]

As the internet has become more pervasive, countries have used it to gather intelligence and to spy on one another. The loss of the internet would be an enormous blow to intelligence agencies. Sharing information would become slow and difficult. Some governments might react to such a situation rashly. It's impossible to predict how each government would react; however, it's not hard to imagine a series of events that could escalate into a conflict. Assuming world leaders could maintain order and resist the urge to blow each other up, other problems would surface. The internet has become an important part of many educational programs. The loss of the internet would leave a void that other resources would need to fill. Resources cost money -- something that would be in short supply as markets around the world try to recover from staggering losses. In the United States, military organizations and some research institutions are part of networks that are similar to the internet but are technically not part of the internet itself. If these networks remained unaffected, at least some electronic communication and data transmission would be possible. But if our imaginary crisis extended all the way to these computer networks, the country would become vulnerable to all sorts of attacks.

#### DDoS attacks on military systems cause accidental nuclear launch

Shah 19 [Syed Sadam Hussain, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Offensive Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/190313\_Shah\_OffensiveCyber\_pageproofs2.pdf, poapst]

Denial of service attacks (DDoS). Denial of service attacks are attempts to overwhelm internet services, websites, or networks with unmanageable traffic, crashing the program to deny access to services. In nuclear command and control, DDoS attacks could break the communications between nuclear forces and decisionmakers or could cut off power supplies and jam communications and missile control systems. Such attacks could jeopardize the integrity of network data and could even neutralize missiles and missile defenses to allow a successful nuclear attack. Moreover, if communications systems are jammed or spoofed, then nuclear decisionmaking is compromised. These attacks could be highly damaging in the event of a crisis.

#### Interruptions in grid reliability cause cascading nuclear meltdowns—extinction

Huff 14 (Ethan A. Huff, staff writer. “Nuclear power + grid down event = global extinction for humanity” August 12th 2014, <http://www.naturalnews.com/046429_nuclear_power_electric_grid_global_extinction.html)>

If you think the Fukushima situation is bad, consider the fact that the United States is vulnerable to the exact same meltdown situation, except at 124 separate nuclear reactors throughout the country. **If anything should happen** to our nation's poorly protected electric power grid, these reactors have a high likelihood of failure**, say experts,** a **catastrophic scenario** that would most likely lead to the **destruction of all life on our planet, including humans.** Though they obviously generate power themselves, nuclear power plants also rely on an extensive system of power backups that ensure the constant flow of cooling water to reactor cores. In the event of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), for instance, diesel-powered backup generators are designed to immediately engage, ensuring that fuel rods and reactor cores don't overheat and melt, causing unmitigated destruction. But most of these generators were only designed to operate for a maximum period of about 24 hours or less, meaning they are exceptionally temporary in nature. In a real emergency situation, such as one that might be caused by a systematic attack on the power grid, it could take days or even weeks to bring control systems back online. At this point, all those backup generators would have already run out of fuel, leaving nuclear reactors everywhere prone to meltdowns. Cost to retrofit power grid minimal, but government won't do it According to Dave Hodges from The Common Sense Show, it would only cost taxpayers about $2 billion to update the power grid and protect it from attack or shutdown. This is roughly the same price as a single B-1 Stealth Bomber, or the annual sum that the government pays American farmers not to grow crops. In other words, it is a mere drop in the bucket compared to everything else the government spends money on. And yet nothing is being done to protect the power grid against failure or, worse yet, an attack by domestic or foreign enemies. Investment guru Paul Singer warned about this, noting that an electromagnetic surge is the "most significant danger" facing the world today. "Even horrendous nuclear war, except in its most extreme form, can [be] a relatively localized issue," said Singer, "and the threat from asteroids can (possibly) be mitigated." Spent fuel racks contain radiation that won't be contained during an emergency In the event of a disaster or loss of power, a nuclear plant's emergency power systems are designed to automatically engage, while its control rods are dropped into the core. Water is then pumped into the reactor to mitigate excess heat, in turn preventing a meltdown. And just to be sure, spent fuel rods are encased in both a primary and secondary containment structure, aiding in meltdown prevention. But if the emergency results in longer-term power losses, and backup generators run out of power, this constant flow of cooling water will eventually run dry. This is what happened at Fukushima, resulting in several reactor cores melting right through their containment structures into the ground. There is also the issue of residual spent fuel, which is normally contained in high-density storage racks that are not taken into account during an emergency. "...contained in buildings that vent directly into the atmosphere, radiation containment is not accounted for with regard to the spent fuel racks," explained Hodges. "In other words, there is no capture mechanism." Like many others, Hodges wants to know why the government refuses to take this important situation more seriously. Again, it wouldn't cost that much in the greater scheme of things to bring the power grid up to proper safety standards, protecting Americans and their infrastructure from a possible cascade of nuclear meltdowns. So why isn't it happening?

#### Cyber attacks destroy critical infrastructure – causes nuclear war

Ravich et al 15 (Samantha. Samantha Ravich is CEO of A2P, LLC, a social media analysis firm. She previously was Co-Chair of the Congressionally-mandated National Commission for Review of R&D Programs in the U.S. Intelligence Community. From 2009-2011, Ravich was Senior VP at IPS, a global analysis firm; she also was Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney and served in the White House for 5½ years. “Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare: An Evolving Challenge” Hudson Institute) 8/12/15 RK

It might also be possible to disrupt other critical infrastructure by cyber means. In cases in which the internet is used to convey commands from system operators to the physical infrastructure components, there would be a possibility of malicious penetrations into the control system. Such remote electronic control is now common for many types of critical infrastructure, e.g., electrical grids, oil and gas pipelines, and railroads. In each case, there are great efficiencies that can be gained by enabling an operator in a control room to send commands to generators, transformers, pumping stations, compressors, signals, switches, etc. located throughout the country. Using the internet to convey these commands obviates the expense of creating a separate, dedicated communications system. In 2009, President Obama noted that “cyber intruders have probed our electrical grid and … in other countries cyberattacks have plunged entire cities into darkness.”42 The country in question appears to have been Brazil, which suffered large-scale outages in 2005 and 2007.43 63 According to Richard Clarke, cybersecurity advisor to President George W. Bush, hackers were in fact responsible for bringing down power systems in Brazil. He further expressed the fear that the rapid adoption of “smart meters” (which report not only total electricity consumption, but also when the electricity is consumed) before adequate cybersecurity safeguards were devised suggests that something similar could happen in the U.S.44 In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security announced that the control system network of a public utility had been compromised by hackers, but that there was no evidence the utility’s operations were affected.45 The fact that operations were not affected suggests the possibility that the hackers were implanting malware in the system to facilitate a future attack. Such cybersabotage could be undertaken to weaken a country economically; however, the effects could be so widespread and damaging as to constitute, at least in the eyes of the victim, an act of war, against which it might feel compelled to retaliate. In any case, the damage, however severe, would likely be reparable in at most weeks, after which the victim’s overall economic strength would recover. Thus, it is likely that action of this sort would be most likely undertaken as a prelude to all-out (kinetic) warfare. On the other hand, if the cybersabotage were able to do extensive physical damage to the infrastructure, then the victim might be weakened economically for a considerable period of time. Another motive for cybersabotage against oil or gas infrastructure might be to disrupt markets in order to raise prices or damage confidence in a given energy supplier. Even temporarily damaging or shutting down of a major oil supplier’s infrastructure would raise world prices, thus benefiting oil exporters and harming importers. Similarly, cybersabotage of a gas pipeline or liquid natural gas (LNG) facility could harm confidence in that victim’s reliability as a gas supplier, to the benefit of alternative suppliers.